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I. Introduction 
Considerable controversy has emerged in Wisconsin n2 and Ohio n3 over legislative attempts to 
limit the power of unions and the scope of public sector collective bargaining n4 in education. Union-
led bargaining increases in educator salaries n5 and retirement benefits n6 won at the negotiating table 
not only impose significant additional costs on school boards. n7 Even so, these advances in salary 
and benefits outpace those in the private sector n8 and are becoming increasingly untenable for the 
public till, n9 these disputes reflect the degree to which teachers and their unions have come to treat 
collective bargaining as an immutable, entrenched right, n10 regardless of its impact on school board 
budgets and the ability of taxpayers to provide adequate funding. Not surprisingly, as a subject of 
continuing study, n11 stakeholders, n12 including some teachers, n13 have raised questions about the ne-
cessity of unions n14 and the value of collective bargaining. 
Organized labor and collective bargaining in education have grown to the point that three out of 
four public school teachers in the United States are represented by either a union or a professional 
association; n15 this stands in stark contrast to the status of employees in the private sector. n16 In fact, 
not including the dwindling numbers of teachers who are organized in religiously affiliated non-
public schools, n17 the less than 7% of private sector workers who are union members represent a 
mere one-fifth of what private sector membership was at its height in the mid-1950s. n18 
The conflict between public sector labor unions and their employers in Wisconsin and Ohio 
over legislative reforms with which they disagree, especially those representing teachers, has at-
tracted significant attention in the popular media. However, this evolving dynamic has yet to be 
subject to scrutiny in academic fora. n19 Thus, this Article examines the history, process, and status of 
the relationship between and among teacher unions, collective bargaining, and public school em-
ployers, concentrating on Wisconsin and Ohio, before reflecting on their broader meaning. In so do-
ing, this Article considers whether unions and bargaining are the tail that wags the dog in the day-
to-day world of public education and beyond, particularly as unions in Wisconsin seek to remove 
the governor for spearheading reform efforts. n20 This Article focuses on developments in the two 
bellwether states of Wisconsin and Ohio because they have generated the most controversy n21 over 
whether unions have too much say about work rules that shape the terms and conditions of teacher 
employment. 
The remainder of this Article, then, is divided into four substantive sections. The first part pre-
sents a brief history of teacher unions as a lead into the second section, which examines key ele-
ments in the practice of collective bargaining that have helped to set the stage for the current debate 
about its future in public education. The third portion reviews developments aimed at reforming 
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teacher bargaining in Wisconsin before turning to Ohio where the initial attempt to reform collec-
tive bargaining was defeated at the ballot box. n22 Based on the tales of these two states, which have 
thus far had different outcomes with regard to reforms of bargaining, the fourth section reflects on 
what has transpired in Wisconsin and Ohio while reflecting about where teacher unions and collec-
tive bargaining may be heading, n23 particularly as costs for public education continue to escalate de-
spite the current economic downturn. n24 Of course, as suggested in a brief conclusion, since the sta-
tus of bargaining is likely to remain in a state of flux, this Article serves as an exploratory analysis 
of a saga whose last chapter will be written sometime in the future. 
II. Teacher Unions and Collective Bargaining 
A. Prolegomena 
Before turning to a history of teacher unions, and in light of events that have transpired in Wis-
consin and Ohio, this Article adopts the perspective that public sector collective bargaining remains 
a zero-sum game. In bargaining situations, the purpose of labor unions is, above all else, to protect 
and save the jobs of their members while seeking to increase their compensation packages, typically 
at the expense of taxpayers. Not surprisingly, from the union's perspective, all else, including lofty 
rhetoric about caring for students and providing members input into their professional lives and ac-
tivities, is secondary at best. Put another way, when dealing with collective negotiations in public 
education or the private sector-attempted new, alternative models, such as win-win bargaining that 
is designed to limit or eliminate conflict notwithstanding n25 -the zero-sum impact of bargaining is 
that one side wins and the other loses. 
Against this backdrop, this article maintains that the power teacher unions have gained through 
mandatory membership or the payment of "fair share" fees in many states is based on what may 
well be the faulty notion that advancing union goals are in the best interest of public education and 
the children that the unions are designed to serve, a topic discussed in more detail below. n26 To this 
end, the Article explains that since teacher collective bargaining exists primarily to advance the 
power of unions in the educational process, in part through mandatory membership and compulsory 
dues or "fair share" fees, the conflicts that have arisen in Wisconsin and Ohio, in attempts to reform 
this process, were inevitable since organized labor apparently sees no need to change the status quo. 
B. History of Teacher Unions 
In jurisdictions permitting the practice, collective bargaining is the vehicle by which public 
school boards and the exclusive representatives or unions of their employees meet to negotiate sal-
ary and other terms and conditions of employment, a term of art grounded in the National Labor Re-
lations Act. n27 Collective bargaining in education is modeled largely on the process as it exists in 
private sector industrial labor relations, an approach which is premised on standardized work prod-
ucts and outputs. n28 
Since the industrial labor relations model originates in workplaces that vary significantly from 
the more white-collar professional culture of schools, an argument can be made that this approach 
may not be the best vehicle for addressing labor relations in education. n29 Moreover, even though 
"schools are utterly dependent on teachers not acting like industrial workers . . . [t]he disjuncture 
between how teachers are organized has become increasingly apparent over the past fifteen years 
during which the overall institutional quality and capacity of public education has become a policy 
issue." n30 This disconnect in treating teachers as industrial workers is reflected in the prevailing use 
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of across-the-board pay increases, which "ignore any relationship between salary and effective-
ness." n31 Even so, as revealed in developments in Wisconsin and Ohio, teachers and their unions 
have rejected attempts to move beyond traditional bargaining models. n32 
Putting aside debate about whether the current model of bargaining is most appropriate for edu-
cation at this time, and what constitutes a union, as opposed to a professional association, since both 
focus on winning benefits for their members, their lofty rhetoric about children notwithstanding, n33 
the reality is that two major national labor organizations, using the term as it is defined in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, n34 represent the interests of American public school teachers. These two 
groups, the National Education Association (NEA), the largest teacher organization in the United 
States, n35 and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), also wield political clout by means of 
financial contributions to the Democratic Party n36 and its members. n37 As much power as these two 
bodies wielded separately, and despite talks aimed at fostering closer relations between the two or-
ganizations, n38 the NEA and AFT have chosen not to merge formally at the national level, n39 even 
though consolidations have occurred in at least three states. n40 
The NEA, which historically prefers thinking of itself as a professional association rather than a 
union, traces its origins to the summer of 1857. n41 However, until the NEA implemented unified 
state-national membership in the 1970s, membership in its state associations was significantly larger 
than the national body. n42 Its current focus on teachers notwithstanding, the NEA did not elect a 
classroom teacher as its president until 1928, and the next classroom teacher was not chosen for an-
other eleven years. n43 In fact, until 1945, only three teachers served as president of the NEA insofar 
as their leaders were primarily school administrators or college presidents. n44 
The other national teachers group, the AFT, founded in 1916 as an association formally affili-
ated with organized labor, views itself as a labor union. As significant as the AFT is, it was not the 
first teacher union in the United States. The first union, the Chicago Teachers' Federation, created in 
1897, voted to affiliate with the Chicago Federation of Labor in 1902. Subsequently, in April 1916, 
the leaders of three teacher unions in Chicago and one local teacher union from Gary, Indiana, met 
in Chicago to form a national organization. n45 By May of 1916, eight local unions were affiliated 
with the national organization: two from Chicago (Chicago Federation of Men Teachers and Chi-
cago Federation of Women High School Teachers), along with one each in Gary, Indiana; New 
York City; Oklahoma; Scranton, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C. Also during 1916, Samuel 
Gompers welcomed these local unions into the American Federation of Labor n46 as the American 
Federation of Teachers. n47 
The AFT's affiliation with organized labor came none too soon for teacher unions because, in 
1917, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the Chicago Board of Education had the authority to 
prohibit its teachers from joining a union. n48 An en banc panel of the Supreme Court of Washington 
n49 later affirmed that a local school board had the power to adopt a resolution dictating that it would 
not hire or retain employees if they were members of a teacher association; the court added that ed-
ucational officials could require teachers to sign a declaration acknowledging the board's position. n50 
As teachers in public schools struggled to secure the right to engage in negotiations with their 
boards, changes in the private sector were advancing the course of collective bargaining. After more 
than fifty years of labor strife in the private sector aimed at granting workers a greater say in setting 
the terms and conditions of their employment, n51 the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, also known 
as the National Labor Relations Act, n52 granted union- organizing rights to employees in the private 
sector. The Wagner Act also created the National Labor Relations Board to mediate private sector 
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labor disputes. n53 These developments in federal law established a precedent for the developments of 
similar protections for public school teachers through the adoption of state, rather than federal, stat-
utes. 
The first negotiated teacher contract in public education was signed in 1944, in Cicero, Illinois, 
where the AFT local union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the local school 
board. n54 This development notwithstanding, in 1947, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that officials 
representing the City of Dayton were not obligated to deduct dues from the salaries of union mem-
bers and pass the funds on to their unions, a practice now known as "dues check-offs." n55 This judg-
ment was abrogated in 1959 by the adoption of a law that permitted employees to authorize such 
deductions from their pay. n56 In 1951, Connecticut's highest court, although conceding that educa-
tors had the right to bargain collectively, affirmed that strikes by teachers were illegal, n57 a situation 
that remains in effect in most states. n58 
Change began to emerge with regard to the status of public sector bargaining in the 1950s. Offi-
cials in Cincinnati began bargaining with municipal employees in 1951, n59 even though Ohio did not 
adopt a statewide statute for teachers until more than a generation later. n60 Public sector bargaining 
received an even bigger boost in 1958 when then Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City promul-
gated an executive order permitting municipal employees to bargain collectively for the first time. n61 
In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to mandate collective bargaining by public employees. n62 
President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 of January 17, 1962, establishing a federal 
policy of granting recognition to unions of governmental employees, served as a harbinger of the 
thrust for public school teacher unions. n63 Less than three months later, the movement toward 
teacher unions took a dramatic turn in favor of teachers when, on April 11, 1962, members of the 
United Federation of Teachers in New York City, recent victors in a representation election over the 
AFT, n64 voted to strike.  n65 Although more than one-half of the City's teachers went on strike, they 
returned to work a day later in the face of an injunction ordering them to do so. n66 This brief strike 
led to a wave of national public school n67 teacher activism, culminating in having forty-one states 
with some type of legislation requiring some form of bargaining as of 1975, n68 the heart of the first 
generation of teacher unions. At present, more than thirty jurisdictions have enacted statutes grant-
ing teachers the right to organize and bargain collectively with their school boards over terms and 
conditions of employment. n69 
III. The Process and Subject Matter of Collective Bargaining 
Before reviewing attempted reforms of collective negotiations for public school teachers, this 
section provides a brief overview of the bargaining process. n70 In so doing, this part of the Article 
highlights key aspects of the bargaining process, most notably the topics that may be subject to ne-
gotiations, a major issue addressed by current reform efforts. 
The extent to which local school boards may engage in bargaining varies from one jurisdiction 
to the next, such that states can be placed in one of three categories: those granting public employ-
ees the right to form unions; those with right-to-work laws; and those forbidding public sector un-
ions. As noted, a majority of jurisdictions explicitly permit sector collective bargaining for teachers, 
n71 while twenty-two jurisdictions n72 have right-to- work laws in place. n73 The most dramatic limits on 
bargaining exist in North Carolina, n74 Texas,  n75 and Virginia; n76 jurisdictions explicitly forbidding 
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teachers, as public employees, from engaging in negotiations. The resolution of the tensions be-
tween supporters of unfettered bargaining and those who oppose negotiations is likely to shape the 
future of collective bargaining in public education. 
To the extent that state law permits them to do so, school boards and employee unions are free 
to enter into contracts created via legally approved bargaining processes on topics that are properly 
subject to negotiations. Of course, teachers cannot serve as board members in the districts where 
they are employed, since this would present a conflict of interest. n77 
The First Amendment does not require boards to recognize or bargain with unions. Still, the 
First Amendment does protect teachers who join labor organizations n78 and safeguards them from 
being disciplined for doing so or for engaging in protected union activities. n79 However, since the 
preliminary issue of who is protected by negotiated agreements n80 involves who may join bargaining 
units, the next subsection briefly examines this topic. 
A. Bargaining Units 
Before public school boards and their teachers can enter into negotiated agreements, employee 
unions must organize bargaining units. Once state-level public employment relations boards certify 
that unions are organized as a result of votes of eligible employees, n81 they serve as the exclusive 
bargaining agents of their members. n82 From this point on, boards can only negotiate with the exclu-
sive bargaining representatives of their employees. n83 In other words, where teachers are organized 
for collective bargaining, school boards cannot bypass the unions or engage in direct dealings with 
individuals to discuss terms and conditions of employment. n84 
On their part, unions have the duty to represent all employees in good faith n85 during and after 
collective bargaining. This union duty includes having to represent individuals who are not mem-
bers but must pay so-called agency or representation fees, which require non-members or dissenters 
to pay a "fair share" of expenses associated with union representation in educational contexts, n86 
premised on the notion that non-members benefit from the actions of unions as they represent em-
ployees who belong to their ranks. n87 
In order to avoid conflicts of interest, different bargaining units form around varying communi-
ties of interest so that teachers, typically referred to as professional staff, are in one unit while other 
employees, usually referred to as classified staff, such as office workers and maintenance employ-
ees, are in another. n88 While managerial or administrative and confidential employees who work in 
personnel offices and/or others involved in bargaining are usually not permitted to form unions, n89 
laws typically do not treat department heads as supervisors who are excluded from the bargaining 
process. n90 
B. Scope of Bargaining 
It almost goes without saying that collective bargaining is subject to legislative control, a dy-
namic which went to the heart of the controversies in Wisconsin and Ohio, and judicial interpreta-
tion. Statutes vary in scope and specificity as some refer only expansively to terms and conditions 
of employment while others leave gray areas requiring judicial interpretation. 
Topics for bargaining can be classified into three broad, sometimes overlapping, categories. n91 
Consistent with practices in private sector labor law, mandatory topics include such matters as sal-
ary, as well as other terms and conditions of employment. Boards and unions are prohibited from 
engaging in managerial prerogatives such as setting staffing needs and curriculum. A third category 
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of topics, those that are permissive, is most readily subject to judicial interpretation. An applied ex-
ample of a controversial topic of bargaining is class size, since some jurisdictions treat it as ex-
cluded from bargaining n92 while others treat it as either a mandatory n93 or permissive n94 topic of ne-
gotiations. 
C. Mandatory Topics of Bargaining 
In considering whether proposals are subject to mandatory bargaining, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa offered a two-part test. n95 According to the first part of this test, proposals had to fall within the 
meaning of mandatory subjects as listed in the state's collective bargaining statute. Second, the court 
explained that proposals could not be outside of the scope of bargaining. Based on its analysis, the 
court asserted that issues concerning staff who taught more than 300 minutes per day and pooling 
sick leave were mandatory topics, while topics dealing with evaluations and the time and place of 
wage payments were not subject to mandatory bargaining. n96 
Beyond terms and conditions of employment, topics such as salaries n97 and fringe benefits, n98 is-
sues that, again, were central in Wisconsin and Ohio, courts agree that an array of topics are subject 
to mandatory negotiations. For example, due to their impact on financial aspects of employment, 
courts have held that the following topics are subject to mandatory bargaining: a new policy requir-
ing teachers to submit their lesson plans via the Internet; n99 reimbursing teachers for graduate stud-
ies; n100 the impact of a smoke-free work environment; n101 holiday pay; n102 subcontracting of services; 
n103 early retirement incentives; n104 a reduction-in-force plan; n105 stipends for mileage and released 
time while serving on professional development committees; n106 a proposed dress code policy; n107 a 
merit system for hiring, as spelled out in a bargaining contract; n108 moving expenses for a new 
teacher; n109 teacher transfers and reassignments; n110 and whether a contract was to remain in effect 
until the parties negotiated a new agreement. n111 Of course, under the law in Wisconsin and the re-
jected statute in Ohio, all of these topics would have moved to the next category: prohibited topics 
of bargaining. 
D. Prohibited Topics of Bargaining 
Topics that courts have interpreted as beyond the power of school boards to bargain include as-
signments and transfer policies; n112 granting tenure; n113 creating school calendars; n114 appointing prin-
cipals n115 and department heads; n116 and withholding salary increments. n117 
E. Permissive Topics of Bargaining 
If topics are not explicitly excluded from collective bargaining, questions arise as to whether 
they must be subject to negotiations. Although many disputes begin in administrative proceedings, 
they are typically resolved by the courts. In considering whether topics are subject to mandatory or 
permissive bargaining, some courts have proposed guidelines supplementing such factors as condi-
tions of employment, and managerial prerogatives. The courts caution that these judgments must be 
made on a case-by-case basis. Examples of permissive topics of bargaining are broad zipper 
clauses, which allow parties to renegotiate items mid- contract; n118 drug testing; n119 the timing and 
effective dates of lay-offs; n120 and adoption of year-around schooling. n121 
Against this backdrop, the next part of this Article reviews developments in two states, Wiscon-
sin and Ohio, where officials have tried to rein in the power that unions wield through the process of 
collective bargaining. 
IV. Tales of Collective Bargaining Reform 
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This section focuses on the conflicts between public sector labor unions in Wisconsin and Ohio. 
More specifically, this part of the Article examines how the proposed changes in these two states 
have impacted education, as elected officials who have sought to reform collective bargaining by 
placing limits on its scope have, to date, reached different outcomes. Perhaps the greatest difference 
between the laws in these two states is that Wisconsin's statute granted exemptions to firefighters 
along with State Patrol Troopers and State Patrol Inspectors n122 while the Ohio statute was aimed at 
the broader public sector and would have eliminated bargaining for police and firefighters. n123 At the 
same time, Wisconsin's statute survived a judicial challenge, n124 even though its governor is all but 
likely to face a recall election spearheaded by union forces n125 while the law in Ohio was repealed as 
part of a referendum initiated by supporters of organized labor. n126 In light of divergent results in 
these two states, the remainder of this section reviews developments in the bellwether states of Wis-
consin and Ohio. 
A. Wisconsin 
The status of unions and collective bargaining appears to have come full circle in Wisconsin. 
Put another way, Wisconsin led the way as the first state to mandate negotiations for public sector 
employees, n127 including teachers, while also being the initial jurisdiction to enact reforms aimed at 
limiting the scope of unions and collective bargaining. 
Controversy ensued after Republican Governor Scott Walker, who ran on a platform of prom-
ises to balance the state budget, signed the 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 ("Act 10") n128 into law on March 
11, 2011. n129 The Act took effect on June 29, 2011. n130 
Opposition to the proposed Act 10 emerged even before it became law. An estimated 70,000 
noisy protestors rallied outside of the state capitol in Madison, n131 while others defaced the interior 
of the building. n132 Moreover, some sympathetic doctors attended the rallies and wrote "sick notes," 
purportedly excusing protestors from work, n133 and handed them to striking teachers. n134 The bill 
passed solely with the support of Republican legislators after Democratic members adopted the un-
orthodox strategy of leaving the state rather than voting on the proposed Act. n135 
Act 10 was designed to address projected state deficits n136 by setting restrictions on the rights of 
public employees to bargain collectively with their employers. As another cost-saving measure, the 
bill allows local school boards to use the competitive bidding process for healthcare, rather than re-
lying on union- backed plans, resulting in considerable savings to school systems and the state. n137 
The new law limits the ability of public school teachers and their unions to bargain collectively on 
topics other than base wages in about two- thirds of the state's school systems, due to the existence 
of contracts that were adopted before it came into effect. n138 Moreover, Act 10 requires the state's 
63,000 teachers, most of whom pay nothing towards their pensions, n139 to contribute 5.8% of their 
salaries to fund their retirements and at least 12.6% of the cost of their health insurance premiums. 
n140 
Unhappy with the new law, supporters of teacher unions filed an all but immediate judicial chal-
lenge led by Dane County District Attorney Ismael Ozanne, a Democrat. n141 The suit claimed that 
state officials violated Wisconsin's Open Meetings Law by failing to provide the required twenty-
four-hour public notice in enacting a budget repair bill, which included provisions mandating addi-
tional public employee contributions for health care and pensions, curtailing collective bargaining 
rights for most state and local public employees, and making appropriations. n142 In an unpublished 
opinion, a trial court issued a temporary restraining order against the newly passed bill on March 
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18, 2011, n143 primarily on the ground that the legislature violated the Open Meetings Law. An inter-
mediate appellate court, in an unpublished order, certified the question for an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. n144 
As the dispute over Act 10 was wending its way through the courts, a related controversy took 
center stage: the election of Wisconsin Supreme Court justices. In the end, a key member of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, n145 David T. Prosser, largely considered to be a member of the conserva-
tive end of the bench, n146 in what was supposed to be officially a nonpartisan race, n147 defeated a 
critic of the Governor, JoAnne Kloppenburg, a state assistant attorney general, n148 to retain his seat. 
n149 This election set the stage for later developments. 
On further review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin vacated the temporary restraining order in 
State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald. n150 In a four- to-three judgment split along philosophical, if not 
party, lines, the court reasoned that the trial judge lacked the authority to enjoin a law of great pub-
lic importance. n151 The court added that the legislature did not violate the Open Meetings Law even 
though it limited the number of members of the public who were present during the debates prior to 
the Act's enactment and did not violate state constitutional provisions calling for keeping the doors 
of each house to be kept open except when public welfare requires secrecy. In addition, the court 
ruled that the legislature satisfied the Open Meetings Law both because the Senate and Assembly 
were kept open to the press and public during debates while television stations were present to 
broadcast the  proceedings live as they occurred. n152 The district attorney who initiated the litigation 
has since asked the state's highest court to re-open the case based on his allegation that one of its 
members should have recused himself in the dispute. n153 
The political gamesmanship in Wisconsin did not end with Ozanne as opponents of Act 10 
sought to recall legislators who voted in favor of the law. In a round of acrimonious recall elections 
in July 2011, which cost taxpayers a record $ 43.9 million, n154 Republicans managed to retain four of 
the six contested seats, allowing them to preserve their majority in the upper chamber; albeit by a 
margin of seventeen-to-sixteen rather than the nineteen-to-fourteen advantage that they had prior to 
the recall elections. n155 
Even amid reports that Act 10 has helped to cut deficits in many school districts in Wisconsin, 
n156 union-backed opponents unsuccessfully sought Walker's recall n157 in an election with an estimated 
cost of $ 9 million. n158 At the same time, a survey revealed that only 5% of respondents viewed col-
lective bargaining as the most important issue facing Wisconsin and 43% thought that Republicans 
were moving the state in the right direction; only 37% maintained that the Republicans were leading 
Wisconsin in the wrong direction. n159 
The recall campaign, which turned acrimonious with regard to pro-Walker supporters, n160 sought 
to gather 540,208 valid signatures by January 17, 2012, n161 but later claimed to have gathered one 
million signatures. n162 In light of earlier irregularities, n163 it remained to be seen whether supporters 
reached their goal, n164 even as state officials stepped up efforts to validate signatures. n165 
As the recall campaign progressed, Governor Walker "expect[d] a recall election 'sometime in 
early June [2012],'" n166 assuming that officials did not need more time to evaluate the legitimacy of 
petitions. n167 The fact that the attempted recall of Walker failed aside, such a strategy raises a ques-
tion about the power of unions who represent a minority of residents in Wisconsin to impact state 
and local economies as well as the political process as a whole. 
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Along with potential electoral activity, judicial challenges to Act 10 are far from finished. Op-
ponents of the new law filed suit in the federal trial court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. n168 This suit 
alleged that the Act impermissibly created two categories of workers, those who can engage in bar-
gaining and those who lack the right to do so. n169 
In the actual litigation, a federal trial court in Wisconsin rejected the major challenges to Act 10, 
ruling that the statutory limits on the bargaining rights of general public employees, but not public 
safety workers, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. n170 How-
ever, the court decided that requiring the annual recertification of unions representing general public 
employees and forbidding the deduction of dues from their paychecks, but not applying their condi-
tions to the labor organizations representing public safety employees did violate equal protection. n171 
In state-based litigation, union-backed opponents of Act 10 claimed that the new law violated 
the state constitution. n172 This suit alleged that by enacting a budget repair bill ignoring the require-
ments governing special legislative sessions, the law placed limits on the topics that unions could 
discuss with public employers, imposed severe pay raise limitations on union workers that are inap-
plicable in the private sector, and limited the associational rights of union workers in their pursuit of 
increased pay. n173 
Interestingly, in the wake of the changes brought about by Act 10, unions continue to operate, if 
not flourish, in Wisconsin. In fact, a news report revealed that about 90% of the unions in Wiscon-
sin chose to recertify even though the new law placed limits on their ability to bargain collectively 
on behalf of their members. n174 
B. Ohio 
Developments in Ohio, which were less factually complex and not subject to the same level of 
political intrigue, were no less contentious than in Wisconsin. As such, the situation in Ohio does 
not warrant as much detailed review as in Wisconsin. 
As in Wisconsin, Ohio's new bargaining law, commonly referred to as Senate Bill 5, was ap-
proved along party lines as none of the Democrats in the General Assembly voted in favor of the 
304 page law. n175 The bill passed by a one vote margin of seventeen-to-sixteen in the State Senate 
along party lines but comfortably made it through the House on a fifty-three-to-forty-four vote be-
fore being signed into law by Republican Governor John Kasich on March 31, 2011. n176 Unlike its 
counterpart, Act 10 from Wisconsin, an argument can be made that the Ohio Senate Bill 5 over-
reached by including all public employees, including nurses, police, and firefighters in addition to 
educators. n177 
Ohio's new collective bargaining law, which was greeted by protests since its inception, n178 was 
designed to help the state overcome budget deficits by limiting unions to engage in negotiations 
with school boards over salary but not health care, sick time, or pension benefits. n179 The law was 
also envisioned as a tool to eliminate automatic longevity and degree-pay increases for educators 
and replace them with merit performance-based pay while banning strikes and requiring all public 
employees to pay at least 15% of their health care costs. n180 The Kasich administration had estimated 
that these changes would have saved local governments, including school boards, more than $ 1 bil-
lion per year, n181 helping to reduce an $ 8 billion state-wide deficit. n182 
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Opponents of Senate Bill 5 mounted an aggressive campaign, collecting a record number of sig-
natures to have a referendum placed on the ballot on Election Day in November 2011. n183 In re-
sponse to what was known as Issue 2, the law was repealed in a decisive twenty-two point defeat at 
the polls. n184 Interestingly, though, even as voters rejected a bill that was designed to reduce costs in 
public education, they continue to defeat levies designed to fund local public school systems in 
Ohio, n185 a move that is inexplicable insofar as the largest expenditures that boards have cover em-
ployee salaries and benefits. n186 
Both sides seem to recognize that this controversy is far from over in Ohio. Even so, the Gover-
nor has not revealed what steps he may take in trying to reduce deficits after the public rejected his 
attempted revisions of the collective bargaining law. n187 
V. Reflections 
The final two sections of this Article reflect on the controversies about the scope and parameters 
of collective bargaining between public school teachers and their boards in Wisconsin and Ohio, us-
ing developments in these two states as a springboard to an examination of the larger picture con-
cerning education labor relations. This part of the Article, then, serves as a cautionary tale for edu-
cational leaders, lawmakers, policymakers, and attorneys in other jurisdictions, regardless of 
whether they have bargaining in place. As one of the first articles on the controversies in Wisconsin 
and Ohio, the author hopes that this piece generates on-going discussion about whether the econ-
omy or voters are willing to sustain a "business as usual" approach with regard to the growth of the 
influence of public sector teacher unions via bargaining and resulting increases in expenditures, 
most of which are for salaries absent concomitant improvement in student achievement. 
A. Preliminary Matters 
As a precursor to discussing the future of collective bargaining in public education, it is worth 
noting the following initial points highlighting emerging tensions between and among interests of 
unions, their public employers, and taxpayers who are ultimately responsible for paying the bills. 
First, although the First Amendment to the United States Constitution affords public employees 
the opportunity to organize and bargain collectively, it does not guarantee such a right. n188 Accord-
ingly, as indicated earlier, jurisdictions are free to place limits on bargaining by means of state con-
stitutions or statutes. n189 To this end, school boards and employee unions must work together to de-
velop equitable systems for all, most notably for students and taxpayers who ultimately pay the sal-
aries of teachers and other public employees. As part of this limit, a question can be raised as to 
whether "fair share" fee arrangements for the collective bargaining process, a topic discussed ear-
lier, n190 should be permitted to continue. A difficulty with fair share fees is that they arguably in-
volve a form of compelled speech insofar as non- members and dissenters are required to pay fees 
essentially to help support organizations and/or points of view with which they disagree, n191 in po-
tential violation of the First Amendment, even if they do benefit from union activities in terms of 
salaries and other benefits. 
Second, as reflected in the motivations behind the attempted reforms of collective bargaining in 
Wisconsin and Ohio, public officials are seeking to operate effective, cost-efficient school systems 
by limiting the scope of bargaining, particularly during the economic downturn that the United 
States is currently facing. At the risk of engaging in a form of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis inso-
far as student achievement is a multi-factored issue well beyond the scope of this Article, questions 
arise about the need to place limits on increasing expenses due largely to cost increases based on 
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salaries and benefits for educators who often raise the battle cry that funding increases are needed to 
help children. n192 This claim persists even as student test data remain essentially flat, n193 suggesting 
that there is a less than robust return on the investment of state dollars in public education. Further, 
the gap between what public school educators earn continues to widen when compared with worker 
salaries in the private sector, n194 making public education an increasingly expensive, yet not always 
effective, enterprise in some places. It thus remains to be seen how much the public can continue to 
afford to pay for unacceptable results before critics call for more drastic steps such as lay-offs; re-
ducing the length of the school year; n195 and the draconian option of terminating public funding for 
student transportation. n196 
Third, despite their political clout, it must be kept in mind that teacher and other public sector 
unions represent a relatively small percentage of workforce populations in their states. n197 Yet, the 
unions in Wisconsin applied raw political power in attempting to recall legislators who had the te-
merity to refuse to do their bidding. Moreover, as events that transpired in this Article illustrated, 
although the union there redoubled its effort aimed at removing the Governor of Wisconsin, he sur-
vived. Of course, unions also played a large role in the dispute in Ohio. 
In an amazing fete of self-interest, that stands to cost the cash-strapped state $ 50 million, n198 the 
union-led recall effort in Wisconsin proceeded even though Walker's plan seemed to have been suc-
ceeding for the greater public good. In fact, even writers at a newspaper that is critical of Walker's 
reform efforts editorialized that "[he] did balance the budget . . . reduce the structural deficit signifi-
cantly; he did put a lid on property tax increases; he did give schools and municipalities more con-
trol over their budgets than they've had in years." n199 Put another way, even though respondents to a 
poll in Wisconsin did not perceive public sector collective bargaining as a major issue in the state, 
n200 the unions placed their personal interests ahead of those of the majority as they pursue undoing 
the attempted reforms, much as their counterparts have done in Ohio. Clearly, the failed recall elec-
tion was something of a battle royale between the union and its supporters, both in and out of Wis-
consin, that was watched closely throughout the nation. n201 
Fourth, as a segue into the discussion of where unions and bargaining may be headed, lawmak-
ers and policymakers in other states should be careful not to over- interpret the result of the election 
in Ohio that invalidated the new bargaining law. It is important to adopt an air of caution in review-
ing the outcome in Ohio because it appears that the statute may have over-reached in applying to a 
wide array of public employees. It is possible that a more carefully crafted law, enacted with greater 
support from constituent groups, may be able to garner support leading to needed change so that 
public sector collective bargaining can become more mindful of costs as well as its impact on state 
and local budgets. 
B. A New Era in Collective Bargaining and School Labor Relations? 
History is clear that teacher unions, like other labor organizations, developed at a time when 
workers needed protection from management in order to have a fair say in shaping the terms and 
conditions of their employment. n202 However, insofar as teacher unions have taken on a role as a ma-
jor political force that can seek to unseat governors and legislators with whom they disagree, as in 
Wisconsin, or can stymy the enforcement of a reform law, as in Ohio, then it may be time to re- 
conceptualize their role in education. 
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It may be propitious for a re-examination of the status of unions because their reliance on bene-
fits gained through collective bargaining appears to have made them the tail wagging the dog of ed-
ucation by arguably exercising more authority than observers would have expected in terms of their 
ability to shape both state and local politics. Unions have gained an advantageous position through 
the attainment of significant political clout such that they are now something of a sword that can be 
used to attack opponents rather than a shield aimed primarily at protecting employees who lacked 
unequal bargaining power. Consequently, the remainder of this section raises questions for consid-
eration when thinking about the future of teacher collective bargaining in light of the needs to bal-
ance the rights of organized labor and the taxpayers who pay the bill, not to mention the needs of 
students who are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the "system," yet suffer most when 
schools fail to operate well. 
First, while not wishing to be perceived as displaying an anti-union animus, in light of earlier 
discussions about how the efforts of Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin have actually achieved 
their goal of saving the public money, n203 questions should be raised about the propriety of allowing 
unions of public school teachers and other governmental employees to "hire" their bosses n204 by con-
tributing large sums of money almost exclusively to one party and its candidates since they will do 
their bidding. n205 The reach of organized labor was shamelessly demonstrated in Wisconsin when 
legislators set a poor precedent by deciding to flee the state rather than vote on a bill that would 
have angered or disappointed their union-backed supporters. n206 Given the essential need for trans-
parency in establishing public trust, meaning that elected (and appointed) officials should be open in 
all of their dealings, and not beholden to one side or the other, especially when dealing with tax-
payer funds, n207 it is important to safeguard the rights of the public by placing limits on the power of 
unions to influence elections for their own gain and that of their members. 
In a second, related point, as discussed earlier, n208 the Supreme Court has rejected claims that 
placing limits on the extent to which non-union members or dissenters must provide financial sup-
port for unions via fair share fee arrangements violate the First Amendment rights of labor organiza-
tions. Accordingly, it may be desirable, if not necessary, to place restrictions on how much teacher 
unions can donate to political candidates just as there are caps on the amount of contributions that 
individuals can make to specific political candidates. n209 Seeking to place a limit on union donations 
may be timely because there appears to be a clear conflict of interest in allowing public sector labor 
organizations such as teacher unions to provide funding for legislators who ultimately serve as their 
employers. n210 
Third, perhaps it is time to move to a new model, one suggested more than twenty years ago, 
which calls for shared decision and policy making n211 while treating teachers as professionals n212 with 
greater levels of autonomy in their daily activities. Insofar as professionals, particularly in medicine, 
n213 have traditionally not organized as union members who bargain collectively with their employ-
ers, it may be propitious to adopt a new approach in place of the often acrimonious process that 
emerges in the industrial labor model of bargaining. Such a model should focus less on salary and 
benefits for members while demonstrating greater concern for the key constituents, children and 
taxpayers, by holding teachers accountable for student performance. 
A new approach to collective bargaining should seek to move beyond even the win- win mental-
ity wherein both sides hope to come away from the bargaining table with something they sought. 
Instead, a new model would focus on developing shared plans aimed at achieving actual outcomes 
such as improvements in student achievement. Moreover, in suggesting that teachers can take on 
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some managerial prerogatives in decision making such as having responsibility for peer-evalua-
tions, a law authorizing such a process can be devised in such a way as to not have educators run the 
risk of losing tenure as managerial employees. n214 
If states and local school boards are to be able to implement lasting reform concerning the status 
of unions and bargaining, then one lesson to be learned from developments in Wisconsin and Ohio 
is the need to engage in shared decision making while setting realistic goals of changing "the sys-
tem." Of course, as occurred in Wisconsin, when legislators flee a state in doing the bidding of their 
political masters abdicating their legal responsibilities in the process, it is difficult to engage in a 
true consultative legislative process. On the other hand, as revealed in Ohio, leaders may have to 
work in manageable stages, reforming education incrementally rather than attempting to do so in 
one grand and dramatic fashion since this effort essentially set back reform efforts by leading to 
conflict that may make future compromise all the more difficult. 
As part of a new model, teachers and their unions may be forced to consider a controversial ele-
ment that was soundly rejected in the Ohio controversy, namely merit pay. That is, while merit pay 
has long been the subject of considerable debate and is n215 often opposed by teacher unions and other 
critics, n216 in the one-size-fits-all world of unions, good, effective teachers are treated the same as 
their less than adequate colleagues to the detriment of faculty morale, district budgets, and most sig-
nificantly, students, who are forced to endure substandard teaching. n217 Even in conceding that merit 
pay may not be the panacea to heal all that ails public education, perhaps if teachers who are not 
performing as they should were to no longer receive across-the- board pay raises, then they would 
have the motivation either to improve or leave their jobs to others who would actually work to en-
hance student achievement. 
Fourth, when teacher unions resort to the mantra of how higher salaries and benefits are ulti-
mately intended to "help the children," n218 it all but forces observers to take a hard look at exactly 
what this means, especially in light of events in Wisconsin and Ohio, even if they were not univer-
sal. How, for example, were teachers in Milwaukee, a school system with abysmal high school 
graduation rates, n219 concerned with the needs of children when they went out on strike protesting 
Wisconsin's new law? Similarly, how did teachers in Madison focus on the needs of their students 
when the doctors who were present at protests signed bogus "sick notes" excusing them from school 
so that they could engage in similar actions? n220 Further, even if teachers used their own personal 
days to demonstrate, why could they have not done so on weekends so that they were in schools to 
better serve their students? Moreover, what message do teachers send to their students about integ-
rity when many relied on bogus "sick notes" to miss work in pursuit of their own gains? 
Of course, individuals, including public school teachers, have the right to disagree with and pro-
test governmental actions with which they are not in agreement. n221 Still, one can only hope that pro-
testors would make their displeasure known via the ballot box rather than through such noisy and 
destructive displays of public action as occurred in Wisconsin, particularly the state capitol, which 
resulted in additional public expenditures to clean up and repair the mess left behind by those in-
volved. n222 
At the risk of taking on an idealistic tone, might it be too much to ask unions to focus on chil-
dren not only by encouraging their members to remain in schools while working to set higher stand-
ards for teachers via more stringent evaluation standards n223 and students, rather than focus primarily 
on protesting proposed changes in medical coverage or less than sought after wage increases as the 
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law restricted the scope of public sector bargaining? While the need to support one's family is un-
derstandable, if educators and their unions wish to be taken seriously, then those who engaged in 
such raucous activities as occurred in Madison, Wisconsin, have ultimately committed a grave dis-
service to those who seek to live up to their professional responsibilities. 
VI. Conclusion 
If American leaders, whether educators or politicians, truly desire public education to achieve 
the system's goal of developing an educated citizenry, then the time is ripe for transforming the dy-
namics of the relationship between teacher unions and their public employers. It is time for change 
because, as costs continue to rise for salaries and benefits for educators in public schools even as 
student performance remains flat at best, n224 such a situation is increasingly untenable in a rapidly 
changing, competitive world market. Even conceding that improving student performance is a 
multi-faceted concern, it is unfortunate that insofar as public education in many places has failed to 
make a good return for the investments of taxpayer funds, n225 something must be done to improve 
the situation. Allowing the status quo to continue unabated in public education is simply unaccepta-
ble. 
As reflected by developments in Wisconsin and Ohio, change is rarely easy to accomplish. Yet, 
all parties involved in attempts to reform union activities and collective bargaining in education 
should keep in mind that their actions are truly designed to provide a better future for America's 
children. If all sides in public education can focus on the true purpose of schools as educating chil-
dren, rather than simply trying to keep adults employed or playing petty partisan politics, then per-
haps they can learn from what has happened in Wisconsin and Ohio as they develop strategies to 
make progress less daunting while this ongoing drama plays itself out in coming years. 
POSTSCRIPT 
As Governor Walker anticipated, n226 he faced an acrimonious, n227 and expensive, n228 recall elec-
tion campaign. In addition to Walker's having spent $ 47 million and his challenger, Milwaukee 
Mayor Tom Barrett's, having expended $ 19 million, the exact amount spent by unions remains 
open to debate. n229 In sum, the "campaigns and special interest groups may have spent $ 125 million 
or more [and], Wisconsin taxpayers have contributed over $ 20 million to the county and municipal 
costs of holding the 15 recall elections" n230 in June 2012 and August 2011. At the end of the day, on 
June 5, 2012, n231 "almost a third of union members who cast a vote did so for Walker, as did 48% of 
voters who live with a union member but aren't members themselves" n232 in his victory by 6.9 per-
cent of the votes. n233 
Scott Walker's victory does not appear to portend well for public labor organizations. In fact, 
within days of Walker's victory, Republican Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana went on record sug-
gesting that public sector unions should be abolished. n234 Thus, the future bears close watching for 
all interested in the status of teacher collective bargaining in public education. 
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